A traditional API gateway assumes the client already knows which API it wants to call, and enforces one question: is this client allowed to call this endpoint? An agent doesn't arrive with a fixed call plan – it gets a goal and decides which tools to call, in what order, at runtime. That breaks three assumptions a gateway built for apps relies on:

• Identity. An agent delegates work across sessions and to subagents. Without an identity model that survives delegation, Postman's own writeup on the gap notes that systems tend to fall back to shared API keys or overly broad service accounts – a credential, not an agent, is what gets authorized.
• Boundary. An agent takes actions, beyond returning text. Prompt injection can influence which tool gets called next; untrusted tool output can feed back into the agent's own reasoning. Neither threat exists in ordinary request/response API traffic.
• State. An agentic workflow carries conversation history, a plan, and pending approvals across calls. The question becomes contextual – is this agent allowed to take this action, with this tool, using this identity, in this workflow state? – not a static per-endpoint ACL.

The webinar's premise is Postman's answer: route agent traffic (HTTP, MCP, and agent-to-agent protocols) through one gateway that brokers credentials at the boundary instead of handing agents static keys, evaluates that contextual policy question per call, and correlates model calls, tool invocations and policy decisions into one trace – so what an agent did is visible from one place, not stitched together after the fact from scattered logs.

Postman announced general availability of Fabric Gateway in September 2026 as, in its own framing, a control plane for the agentic world (SD Times) (Help Net Security). The deployment model is hybrid: Postman runs the control plane; the customer runs the data plane inside their own cloud, so agent traffic never has to leave the customer's network boundary to be governed (Postman).

The gateway sits as a single enforcement point between agents and everything they touch – HTTP APIs, gRPC services, MCP servers, and A2A agents – applying the same policy uniformly across all four protocols (Postman, "Agent Gateway: The Next Evolution of the API Gateway"). Concretely this means: a unified registry of what an agent can discover in the first place; centralized authentication and credential brokering, so the agent itself never holds a long-lived static key; policy-driven authorization evaluated per call rather than per endpoint; and reliability primitives (fallback chains, circuit breakers) at the same boundary where the policy decision is made. Postman's companion case study describes using the gateway to govern its own agents' access to 42 internal production systems (Postman).

• The vault-plus-proxy pattern in 2026-q2-cloudflare-agents keeps the credential out of the agent's execution environment entirely; does Fabric Gateway's "credential brokering" do the same, or does the agent still receive a short-lived token it could leak?
• The contextual-policy question (identity + tool + workflow state) is exactly the shape of a role-scoped virtual key in 2026-agent-identity-store-layout. Is the policy decision re-evaluated on every call, or cached for the life of a session – and what resets it mid-session if a scope should be revoked?
• Correlating model calls, tool invocations and policy decisions into one trace is an observability claim; whether it also enforces anything security-relevant is separate. What's logged on the deny path specifically – the attempted action, or just a Boolean?
• A hybrid deployment keeps the data plane in the customer's cloud but the control plane at Postman. What's in the control-plane telemetry, and does policy enforcement have a hard dependency on reaching it?

• Cloudflare's Agent Stack — the vault-plus-proxy pattern: credentials injected at a boundary the agent can't tamper with, the same shape as Fabric Gateway's credential brokering.
• A Practical Layout for Agent Identities — role-scoped virtual keys minted at a gateway (LiteLLM, in that note's worked example) instead of handing out the admin credential.
• The Identity Store, Formalized in OWL and SHACL — the data model a gateway's policy engine would need: principal, role, grant, effect.
• Claude Code FreeBSD Jail Egress — a different enforcement point for the same question (what may this agent reach?), done at the network layer instead of an API gateway.

Notes pending.