Table of Contents

1 Background

Security issue like rogue HTML, malicious JavaScript, and XSS have been employed since before 1995.

There were a number of issues related to core JavaScript exploits that came about with the increased use of JavaScript for Ajax in addition to the release of MSIE6 (see issues with arguments, eval, try/catch)

Issues relating to Ajax and history mining1 go back to 2006.

Much of the security work done on JavaScript was performed in 2007 and 2008 and the tools from that era reflect that work (limiting global scope changes, binding of valueOf(), etc.) The primary concern here is that the analysis performed for the implementations at that time haven't been updated to reflect current browsers.

The context for concerns about exploits has also changed: while in 2004 ads were directly injected into site contents most major sites have moved toward iframed deployments. The counter to this is for third-party widgets: limited access should be provided.

1.1 Exploits in the wild

"This example illustrates that library designers do not expect their functions to be called with untrusted arguments. This trust assumption is currently valid, as evidenced by the lack of actual exploits against Twitter, but becomes invalid when hosting ADsafe-verified advertisements." 2

1.2 Confirming asset integrity

1.3 Verifying correctness via ad hoc review

"One reason why prior work has not focussed on verifying correctness of APIs is because present JavaScript, based on the 3rd edition of ECMA-262 standard, is not amenable to static analysis, for reasons discussed in section 2." 3

1.4 Worst case on compromise (DNS or host)

1.5 Lack of data execution

1.6 Communicate between frames / sandboxes

"Web browsers provide a platform for web applications. These applications rely on the browser to isolate frames from different security origins and to provide secure inter-frame communication." 4

2 Nomenclature

2.2 host

The site being viewed by a user that has JavaScript not created by resources

2.3 FBJS

A sub-set of JavaScript designed to run in a hosted container on Facebook.

2.4 secure mashup problem

"Safely displaying third-party advertisements is a special case of the more general secure mashup problem in which an integrator (e.g., a publisher) attempts to interact with a collection of untrusted gadgets (e.g., advertisements)."

2.5 dynamic enforcers

Unlike static verifiers, dynamic enforcers transform the source program by inserting a number of run-time security checks.

2.6 statically verify containment

2.7 unvetted objects

The unvetted objects are the JavaScript objects that are not accessible by the guest script on the empty page. For example, all the objects created by the host page are unvetted because those objects are not present on the empty page. As another example, the document object is unvetted because it is not accessible by the guest script on the empty page, even though document exists on the empty page.5

2.8 CORS


3 Tools

Tool Feature Notes URL
ADsafe static analysis blacklist properties
Blancura static analysis whitelist properties
Caja dynamic analysis    
Closure Compiler lint type annotations  
Cuckoo malware n/a
Dojo Secure static analysis blacklist  
DoctorJS indexing    
Esprima ast    
FBJS transpiler    
Jacaranda static analysis    
JSLint lint    
parse-js ast    
Web Sandbox dynamic?

3.1 ADsafe   adsafe Making JavaScript Safe for Advertising. JavaScript, the programming

ADsafe makes it safe to put guest code (such as third party scripted advertising or widgets) on a web page.

Name Description
create(object) Create a new empty object that inherits from object.
get(object, name) Get the value of the object's name property.
go(id, function) Start the widget. The id string must match the id of the widget's div.
has(object, name) true if the object has an own proerty with that name.
id(id) Identify the widget. The id string must match the id of the widget's div.
isArray(value) Returns true if the value is an array.
later(function, milliseconds) Call a function in the future.
lib(name, function) Register an ADsafe library.
log(string) Post the string to the browser's log.
remove(object, name) Remove a property from the object.
set(object, name, value) Set a property's value on the object.

Crockford compared Caja to ADsafe in

Further analysis of the system is available6 as well as general research on JavaScript core semantics and a verifier for JSLint (+ADsafe)7

3.2 Caja   caja

3.2.1 GlobalObjectPoisoning

Should be possible, even with only manual review, to ensure we don't modify any of the host environment objects.

3.2.2 EvalArbitraryCodeExecution

Shouldn't be using eval or new Function() to bypass creation.

3.2.3 CrossScopeParameterModification

It's unlikely that we would need to be providing an assignment to the arguments object. Also, most of the validation checks wouldn't allow for this anyway.

3.2.4 ScriptInHtml

This is a fairly general problem if we use a sink system for attempting to clean the data. May need to work with an implementation team to determine what they consider appropriate to push into the DOM.

3.2.5 InnerHtmlYieldsCdata

Would be trivial to show a team that we don't use any of the workarounds with the deprecated elements:

listing plaintext xmp

3.2.6 DomAllowsXsrf

Without using Caja it's difficult to prove that a library doesn't perform these actions.

3.2.7 DomAllowsKeylogging

Would need to prove that we don't have key events handled by the system. Would need to do further review on the static implementation.

3.2.8 RedirectWithoutUserAction

Bypassing the same-origin policy:

"The same-origin policy is a sweeping security restriction on what web content JavaScript code can interact with. It typically comes into play when a web page includes <iframe> elements or opens other browser windows. In this case, the same-origin policy governs the interactions of JavaScript code in one window or frame with the content of other windows and frames. Specifically, a script can read only the properties of windows and documents that have the same origin as the document that contains the script…"

3.2.9 GlobalScopeViaThis

This would need to be something checked via static analysis.

3.2.10 DeleteUnmasksGlobals

3.3 GATEKEEPER8   gatekeeper

with arguments setTimeout setInterval eval apply call Function document.write .innerHTML

3.4 CORS

The followning is just pulled from wikipedia:

CORS is supported by all browsers based on the following layout engines: Gecko 1.9.1 (Firefox 3.5, SeaMonkey 2.0) and above. WebKit (Initial revision uncertain, Safari 4 and above, Google Chrome 3 and above, possibly earlier) MSHTML/Trident 4.0 (Internet Explorer 8) provides partial support via the XDomainRequest object. The following browsers are also noteworthy in their lack of CORS support: No Presto-based browser implements CORS, as of Opera 11.6, Opera Mobile 11.1, and Opera Mini 6.0. Support is expected in version 12.7 Camino does not implement CORS in the 2.0.x release series because these versions are based on Gecko 1.9.0. As of version 0.10.2, Arora exposes WebKit's CORS-related APIs, but attempted cross-origin requests will fail.

4 Tasks

4.1 Define a secure subset of JavaScript

This would need to be done with tools like Esprima or parse-js unless existing tools should be used.

4.2 Manually look for globals, constructor

A manual check should be performed for global pollution.

This is based on "3.1 Containment Architecture"

4.3 Define the success criteria for external vendors

Ad code is often shifted out by the ad networks which makes is a higher threat to a page.

4.4 Define tainted values in the system

A generic suite of test data should be provided to ensure that the system, when writing out data, doesn't allow for an exploit.

4.5 Create tools matrix

4.6 TODO Evaluate: ADsafe

This is largely just about the process of using JSLint as a validation step since this is all a validation process.

4.7 TODO Evaluate: Dojo Secure

4.8 Evaluate: Jacaranda

4.9 Tooling: instrumentation tools

5 Reading

5.1 Language-Based Isolation of Untrusted JavaScript   adsafe

5.2 Preventing Capability Leaks in Secure JavaScript Subsets

Publishers wish to sandbox third-party advertisements to protect themselves from malicious advertisements. One promising approach, used by ADsafe, Dojo Secure, and Jacaranda, sandboxes advertisements by statically verifying that their JavaScript conforms to a safe subset of the language.


Author: Jason Walsh

Created: 2016-11-01 Tue 12:11